

The Dynamic Role of Moslem in Building Indonesia as a Nation-State

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ABSTRACT

This study figures out the historical journey of the Indonesian nation which is full of its own dynamics is marked by the prominent role of Moslem figures in fighting for and maintaining national unity. The socio-cultural diversity is vital capital as well as a big challenge for Indonesia in building a nation-state. For more than seventy years this pluralistic society has been united by one state ideology, namely "Pancasila" which is expressly stated in the constitution. Optimism was reflected in the economic progress achieved in the mid-1990s, but after the 1997-1998 economic crisis which was followed by a multidimensional crisis, social integration experienced major problems. This article explains the role of the Moslem community in establishing the Indonesian nation, seizing, and maintaining independence, as well as the potential threats to national integration. This article emphasizes again that the long journey of the Indonesian nation and the role of the Islamic community in its long history is an important capital that should not be forgotten in efforts to increase Indonesia's glory for the future. From independence until two-thirds of the century of it, the representation of Islamic groups is very calculated in managing government, however, in elections, they only have a significant enough vote but have never won. With a historical approach through a literature review, the author argues that there are many things that need to be done by the Indonesian people, especially the Moslem community to build Indonesia as a strong nation-state.

Keywords: *Indonesia; Identity; Moslem; Nation-State; Pancasila; Pluralistic*

1. Introduction

The state history of the Indonesian nation's ancestors is often said to have started from the 9th to 12th centuries AD when the Sriwijaya Kingdom expanded across the archipelago with a wide span of power covering the island of Sumatra, parts of Kalimantan, the Malay Peninsula until Myanmar. National historical records were continued in the 14th century by a legendary kingdom from East Java: Majapahit in the 13th - 16th centuries which ruled over the islands of Java, Bali, Nusa Tenggara, Sulawesi, parts of Papua, northern and southern Sumatra, Peninsular Malaya, Khmer, and Campa regions. The relics of these two phenomenal kingdoms can be found in various inscriptions and sculptures in the form of statues and temples. Culturally, the Sriwijaya Kingdom was based on Buddhist traditions which was the dominant religion while the Majapahit Kingdom followed mixed Hindu-Buddhist traditions at that time.

Simultaneously with the waning of the Majapahit Empire in the early 15th century, Islam flourished in Java and many parts of Indonesia. (Furnivall, 1939). Several sultanates ruled in

parts of the archipelago but were no larger than the two phenomenal empires until the arrival of colonialists from the West: Portuguese, Spanish, British, and Dutch. Islam as the dominant culture in the island community has never been internalized homogeneously. The Islamic tradition in Java, in particular, is very syncretic with Hinduism and Buddhism. Likewise, Islamic culture on other islands adopts various local community traditions.

The presence of Muhammadiyah as a social movement since 1912 and one of its missions was to purify Islamic teachings from various syncretism. This was dealt with by the birth of Nahdatul Ulama in 1926 which wanted to maintain various Islamic traditions that blended with previous ancestors' heritage. This continues so that the diversity of the archipelago's people is polarized into 2 main Moslem factions. In addition, there is religious diversity with the development of Protestant and Catholic adherents beside Hindu and Buddhist believers.

With an area consisting of more than 13,000 islands inhabited by more than 700 ethnic and ethnic groups, the archipelago is increasingly rich in diversity. (Adnan, 2013) As well as horizontal pluralism, pluralism vertically has a great deal of variety, mainly based on property ownership, family lineage, kinship system, and type of work. Therefore, to unify the existing pluralism and to avoid competition from primordial groups, the country's founding fathers agreed to choose Pancasila as the basic value in an effort to unite society.

In the journey of a nation independent for more than 70 years, the Pancasila was the most potent symbol in the New Order era (1967 – 1998) through various outreach programs in schools, work, and residential areas. The military regime strongly supported these programs. Indoctrination was done then by making the Pancasila the single principle in all dimensions of people's lives. However, this situation faded and even reversed after the reforms that accompanied the economic crisis in 1997-1998. Communities and government agencies are segmented into many primordial interest groups with their ideologies. Pancasila can be understood and implemented in various ways by existing elites or interest groups.

This paper explains how Indonesia has been formed through the course of history in order to become a strong nation-state regarding any circumstances (Rodrik, D. 2013; Bloemraad, I., et al., 2008; Kaneva, N., & Stanton, A., 2023). In contrast to Aspinall (2015) who ignores the role of this ascribed status in post-reform Indonesia's development, this study still anticipates potential threats to the integrity of the Indonesian nation related to primordialism as reminded by (Bertrand, 2004; Brown & Wilson, 2007; Fogg, 2019; Formichi, 2021) This study also criticizes Hefner (2016) who sees Islamic group chauvinism as a small ripple that will be opposed by other Islamic groups. Through a socio-historical approach based on secondary data and previous publications, the author explains the history of society in the archipelago from the 13th century to the current situation by placing the sentiments of Islamic society at the center of the discussion and future challenges.

2. Theoretical Review

Following Anthony Smith (2001), a nation is "a human community that occupies a homeland, and has the same myth and shared history, the same culture, a single economy, and shared rights and obligations for all members". Benedict Anderson (McCrone, 1998) argues that a nation is an imaginary political community with the following characteristics: (1) imagined as an association of people (who have never met), (2) has limited territorial boundaries, (3) implies sovereignty and self-determination of its members and (4) the community is seen as a deep and horizontal brotherhood.

Even though Indonesia proclaimed its independence on August 17, 1945, in Jakarta, the Dutch colonialists who had left the archipelago due to Japan's entry finally recognized Indonesia as a sovereign country at the Round Table Meeting in The Hague in November 1949. The dynamics of the struggle of the Islamic elites and society in seizing and fighting for independence create its own sentiments which are often perceived as being left in the wheels of government. Thus, regarding the fundamental problem of nationhood in Indonesia was the development of a group of Moslems who think that the Indonesian state must be based on Islamic Sharia while others had different opinions. (Hefner, 2016)

The Indonesian leaders at that time apart from Soekarno and Hatta; call them Muhammad Room, Haji Agus Salim, HOS Cokroaminoto, KH Hasyim Ashary, Syafrudin Prawiranegara, General Sudirman and many others were devout Moslems. However, these people were less closely associated with Islam's contribution to the struggle for independence than with humanitarian affairs. In the mid-1920s, a young Islamic figure, Sukiman Wirjosandjojo (Elson, 2008:90) said that "national interests must take precedence over group interests and internal conflicts must be resolved". Until then, on October 28 in Batavia young national

leaders such as Muhammad Yamin, Amir Syarifuddin, Sukiman, and Assat declared a youth pledge, "One Nusa One Nation, One Language: Indonesia".

The next case was that several Ulama who have contributed greatly to the country such as Tjut Nyak Dien, Rasuna Said, Sukiman, Hamka, Kiai Haji Mas Mansur, and Kasman Singodimejo are officially recognized as heroes, but different from other figures such as Muhammad Natsir and Syafrudin Prawiranegara who have been around for quite a long time recognized as a national hero because he was accused of having a special relationship with the PRRI rebellion. In other cases, it was as if the state underestimated the contribution of the Moslem community, such as the Jihad Resolution called for by KH Hasyim Asy'ari on 22 October 1945 by mobilizing Islamic boarding schools in East Java to face the British and NICA which led to General Mallaby's killing on 10 November.

This moment was commemorated by the state as Hero's Day with an explanation of the general defence actions of the people of East Java to stop the return of the British military. The community, driven by kyai and santri, realized that the British pretext to disarm the Japanese was accompanied by another agenda, namely the infiltration of Dutch NICA troops to try to regain control of Indonesia. The history lesson informed that the heroic moment was inspired by the people of Surabaya while shouting "Allahu Akbar". However, there are no adequate documents from the state or official books that say about the significant role of kyai, santri, or pesantren in mobilizing that action.

The clerics returning from Mecca tried to restore Islamic logic and traditions that were not in accordance with earlier religious teachings. At that time the purification of Islamic practices worked hand-in-hand with most existing Islamic societies. This created two poles for Moslems, traditional society and modern society. Modern society calls its tradition Muhammadiyah which was founded in 1912 and traditional society builds its own organization called Nahdatul Ulama (NU) which was founded in January 1926. Competition between the two largest Islamic organizations, NU and Muhammadiyah often sticks to the surface, and we don't know when they will actually melt. In the mid-1980s when the New Order severely restricted Islamic values and several policies attacking Islamic symbols such as wearing the headscarf in schools, offices, or public spaces, a new Islamic movement. The young men who were members of recitation groups that are outside the arena then enter the political system by establishing the Welfare Party and then changed to the Prosperous Justice Party. This party criticizes the understanding of Islam in Indonesia which it considers inaccurate and must be straightened out. Islamic values and culture in Indonesia vis-a-vis the new Islamic movement. (Mahmudi, 2008; Shihab, N., & Nugroho, Y., 2008).

3. Method

The descriptions and analyses in this article were prepared based on data obtained through desk research from various literature written by various scholars related to Indonesia. Both were written by Indonesian writers or by Indonesianists who have published numerous publications about Indonesia. Namely, literature that has become a lot of reference in various discourses on Indonesia and Islam which were published from the 1990s to 2020.

The validation process was carried out by conducting discourse from several narratives that have been countered or verified based on rational logic as understood by the scholars. This paper avoids discussing data that so far have contradictory meanings, such as the coup attempted on September 30 whether it was masterminded by the PKI or was it another scenario. Likewise, differences of opinion between the two dominant Islamic factions in Indonesia, namely Nahdatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah, are not used as material for review. Thus, the objectivity of the data and its analysis is more accountable

4. Result

The Indonesia is a name that became popular after being introduced by Adolf Bastian, a German scientist in the 19th century. During the previous decade, two British scholars, George Earl, and James R. Logan, used this word to describe the Thousand Islands (Archipelago) between the Indian and Pacific Oceans. (Elson, 2008, p. 2-4) Then, the youth declared the Youth Pledge on October 28, 1928, as a commitment to recognize one homeland, one nation, and one language: "Indonesia". At that time, people were aware that the people living in the archipelago were one nation, even though they were not sovereign. On August 17th, 1945, Soekarno & Hatta proclaimed Indonesia as an independent nation within a sovereign state.

There were several works of literature that explained the origins of the Indonesian nation's ancestors, but the most argumentative is the opinion that says that there was a migration of people from the Mekong River to Laos. This means that Indonesians of Chinese descent were assimilated into the changing environment. Over time, today's Indians are a mixture of various races and sub-races such as the Mongoloid, Arab, Indian, and also European.

Indonesian civilization began to be recognized by historians in the 7th century when Hindu and Buddhist kingdoms spread across the islands of Java, Sumatra, and Kalimantan. From that time until the 13th century, one of the Buddhist kingdoms in Sumatra, Sriwijaya became prosperous and strong with the strength of its fleet. It controlled the western part of Java and the Malacca Straits to the Malay Peninsula. This Buddhist kingdom established trade relations with China and India. However, in 1025, Chola, an Indian Maritime Kingdom, defeated Sriwijaya, splitting it into many small kingdoms.

In the 13th and 14th centuries, three Hindu kingdoms flourished in East Java: Kadiri (1042-1222), Singosari 1222-1292, and Majapahit 1292 – until the 16th century. The three kingdoms were filled with intrigue, deceit, and war between them. However, the Majapahit Kingdom (Furnivall, 1939, p. 9-14) was the most extraordinary Javanese Kingdom after driving out the Maritime Mongol fleet on the northern coast of Java. It then soon grew to become the most powerful empire in the archipelago. Like the previous kingdoms, the Majapahit's culture was dominated by Hinduism and coloured by Buddhism, animism, and syncretism. However, at the beginning of the 15th century, the Majapahit Empire experienced a rapid decline due to internal conflicts and the rise of Chinese dominance in the maritime field in the waters of the Malacca Strait (Furnivall, 1939. p.15).

After Daha was attacked by the Sultan of Demak in the early 16th century the Majapahit empire became the setting sun. So Demak established itself as a regional power and became the first Islamic Sultanate of Java. It was replaced by the Sultan of Pajang and then the Sultanate of Mataram in a very short time. Simultaneously at this moment, other Islamic kingdoms in Java, Sumatra, Kalimantan, Sulawesi, Maluku, parts of Papua, and Nusa Tenggara adopted "Islamic societies". After the fall of Majapahit, Hindu kingdoms survived in Blambangan in the east and Padjajaran in the west. Meanwhile, the Sultan of Cirebon conquered the Padjajaran Kingdom on West Java Island and later established another Islamic kingdom, the Sultanate of Banten in the 16th century. As a result, the Hindu community retreated to the mountains of East Java and Bali.

There were several arguments about when Islam entered the archipelago. Some literature reports that Islam was brought to Indonesia in the 8th century AD by Indian traders starting from Aceh in North Sumatra and in the following centuries spread throughout Indonesia but others state that Islamic culture in Indonesia originated from China (Ricklefs, 2001, p. 27-30). Several artifacts announcing Islamic life in the 11th century were also found in Sumatra and Kalimantan. (Ricklefs, 2001, p. 28-30). This means that it took a long time for an Islamic society to replace Hindu-Buddhist as the dominant culture. The Islamic tradition, which later became the dominant culture in the archipelago from the 16th to the end of the 19th century, was colored by syncretism. This was because many Hindu-Buddhist traditions were adhered to and even practiced among Islam adherents. Since the 16th century, the Islamic tradition was challenged by Western traditions brought by Europeans (Arifianto, 2009).

4.1. Colonial Period

In 1512 the Portuguese arrived in Indonesia after taking Malacca one year earlier. They searched for highly prized spices such as nutmeg, ginger, cinnamon, cloves, and nutmeg. Therefore, the Portuguese preferred Maluku as the main spice source rather than Java. Since then, the Portuguese have dominated the spice trade until it was taken over by the Dutch. In 1602, the Dutch East India Company (VOC) was formed to control trade with Indonesia and gradually expand its power in Java and Maluku. Throughout the operation, several Islamic Sultanates in Java and Maluku were controlled by the VOC through a very effective strategy. This was creating explosive conflict within the imperial family. After the VOC was indebted to a massive corruption case by its management, in 1799 the Dutch government took over the trading company's authority. Nevertheless, the Dutch Kingdom's operating system in the archipelago remained unchanged from the previous private sector; it monopolized trade and created open clashes between society's elites.

In 1825 the Dutch took Palembang in Sumatra then in 1894 the Dutch took control of Lombok and in 1905 they captured all of Sulawesi. Gradually, the Dutch almost completely controlled the archipelago from Aceh to West Papua with increasingly greedy behavior and

increasingly exploited the people. This was so that the local population became resistant and raised rebellions. In 1825, Prince Diponegoro led the war in Java for five years. But the war ended with a Dutch victory. Diponegoro was then sent into exile in Maluku. Like the Bali rebellion attempts in 1848, 1849, 1858, 1868, and finally in 1906, Aceh's attempts to rebel throughout 1873 - 1908 ended after the Dutch deceived and arrested the Acehese leaders.

4.2. Struggle for independence

The Indonesian state officially declared Boedi Utomo's birth in October 1908 National Awakening Day. This is even though there had previously been an independence movement from the Islamic Trade Syarikat (SDI). As an organization, Boedi Oetomo is an elite and Javanese movement rather than SDI which is followed by Moslem citizens (the majority) who mostly come as small entrepreneurs and the rest are middle class (mostly of Arab blood) from Sumatra, Java, Sulawesi, and Kalimantan.

The same thing happened when the State established the Taman Siswa School on May 2, 1922, as a milestone in education in the country. It celebrated it as National Education Day, despite the fact that the first school built in Indonesia was a Moslem school. Namely pioneered by Muhammadiyah in 1912 under the leadership of KH. Ahmad Dahlan in Yogyakarta and West Sumatra in 1920 established the Thawalib School with its network of traditional schools. This inspired the community and became the center of the struggle for independence from colonialism. (Elson, 2008).

Moslem society's dynamics in political life were colored by other unique things, as can be seen from the number of Islamic representatives in General Elections (GE). The top four parties in the 1955 General Election were determined: the Indonesian National Party 22%, Masyumi 20%, Nahdatul Ulama 18%, and the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) 16%. The total number of votes for Islamic parties (Masyumi, Nahdatul Ulama, and small Islamic parties) was around 41% when calculating the total votes. If calculated more carefully the representation of Islam as a political figure would be higher than nationalists, communists, or even Christians. This election established a New State Institution that represented the people – the “Constituent”, also dominated by Moslems, and this Institution transformed the first verse of Pancasila into a statement "Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa" regarding the obligation to implement Islamic law. At that time, the ulama separated the two poles of Indonesian politics: Islam and Nationalism.

Table 1. General Election for parliament

Party	1955	1997	1999	2014
Nasionalis	23 %	-	2 %	33 %
Komunis	16 %	-	-	-
Islam	41 %	20 %	38 %	33 %
Cristian	7 %	-	2 %	-
Others	13 %	-	-	-
Golkar	-	76 %	26 %	15 %
PDI/ PDIP	-	3 %	33 %	19 %

Source: author, summarized from various sources

In the meetings of the Investigative Body for the Preparatory Work for Indonesian Independence (BPUPKI), the five principles (sila) put forward by Soekarno were rearranged; the fifth precept on religiosity was moved to become the first precept. Internationalism, justice, and humanity remain part of the second precept. The first precept on nationalism was placed as the third precept on Indonesian unity. The third and fourth precepts concerning democracy and social welfare became the fourth and fifth precepts. This arrangement is contained in the Preamble to the 1945 Constitution and was different from Soekarno's idea of placing religiosity last. These elements of Pancasila, which were largely based on traditional Javanese culture, have been brought into harmony with Islamic fundamentalism.

In 1956, Soekarno pushed for Nationalist, Religious, and Communist (Nasakom) as the best concept for the Indonesian nation due to the dichotomy between secular and Islamic groups (Hadiz & Robison, 2004). This concept was strongly opposed by the Masyumi Party and the Islamic community who believed there was something impossible in smelting communism which did not believe in God with religious people in one basket. Disputes over the state's basis continued into the late 1950s when the Constituent Assembly spent much of its time debating internally. Previously, the Constituent Assembly formulated the first precept

of Pancasila "the obligation of Moslems to follow Sharia". Soekarno disagreed and reminded him to return to Pancasila's origins as written in the 1945 Constitution (UUD 1945).

Soekarno decided to issue a Decree by dissolving the Constituent Assembly on July 5, 1959. This policy was welcomed by the Nationalists, Communists, and Christians but caused disappointment for many Moslem groups. Moreover, Soekarno with his Marhaen ideology announced the 5th military division, namely "peasants must be given weapons". This further aroused the suspicion that Islam was marginalized. This means that the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) has better facilities than other political parties. Elson (2008) noted that the communist group also provided other major problems during the Dutch colonial period. They staged a rebellion in 1926 which created several problems in the diplomatic or international affairs of the freedom fighters. The aggressiveness of the Communist Party was also reflected when Indonesia was struggling against Dutch aggression supported by the British army during 1947-1948. The Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) killed thousands of people in Madiun and previously attacked the TNI's Siliwangi Division in Solo (Sutanto, 1994, p. 120-133)

Furthermore, Sutanto (1994) emphasized that the PKI underestimated the role of the Indonesian military in expelling the Dutch Army from the archipelago and declaring an independent state in Madiun on 18 September. (Knapp-Retnowati Abdulgani, 2007, p. 24) Suspicion of the Communist Party was evident from General Suharto's belief that the PKI had killed several generals, gathered large numbers of people in several areas, and tried to rebel against the legitimate government throughout September 1965. (Knapp-Retnowati Abdulgani, 2007: 45-63).

The Darul Islam and Indonesian Islamic Army (DI/TII) rebellions in 1950 in West Java, Aceh, and South Sulawesi were caused by despair against Sukarno's government. (Solahuddin, 2011, p. 69) After the uprisings in Sumatra (PRRI) and in Sulawesi (Permesta), Soekarno, who was very worried and afraid of the Islamic movement, issued a decree to dissolve the Masyumi Party because it was accused of being linked to PRRI and Permesta. To overcome this adverse feeling, Soekarno gave an excellent opportunity to the PKI, which did not believe in God, to coexist socially with Islamic groups. This was done in the Nationalist-Communist "Nasakom" idea. Of course, this policy surprised Moslems because the majority of citizens are Moslems who do not recognize atheism.

After the G30 September incident in 1965, the New Order regime detained Soekarno and issued a policy through parliament in 1983 (Tap MPR No 11/1983) which required all organizations in Indonesia to place Pancasila as the only basic principle (Asas Tunggal). He also instituted a Pancasila indoctrination program (Penataran P4) that all Indonesians, starting from elementary school students to tertiary education, and office workers, must join the program. Thus, in the Soeharto era, it was seen that existing policies used Pancasila as a legitimate tool to justify power and easily accused critics, including Islamic groups, of being "anti-Pancasila".

Just like the previous regime, Soeharto also tended to be suspicious and afraid of Islamic movements and succeeded in marginalizing this group in the arena of the political economy system (Hadiz & Robison, 2004). Suharto was worried that Indonesian Moslems would grow if they united in one solidarity and he believed that this group would be able to take overpower and replace Pancasila with Shari'a and, at the same time, threaten secular nationalists and adherents of other religions.

In 1973 Suharto introduced the Marriage Law which directly disrupted Islamic patriarchal values which generally permitted polygamy. What is more, the Suharto regime acted more rigorously and systematically without providing the potential for Islamic power to develop. Suharto built an institution called Special Operations (Opsus) by executing several operations to create a perception of Moslem groups as radical groups. The hijacking of the Garuda Airline plane in Woyla in 1981 and the Tanjung Priok tragedy in 1984 were the products of Special Operations which accused an Islamic group of being responsible. Likewise, the riots in Situbondo in 1996 discredited Nahdhatul Ulama and its leader Abdurahman Wahid." (Bertrand, 2004, p. 111).

Under Suharto's leadership, Moslems' political participation was suppressed, and its leaders were closely monitored. In contrast to this, several Christian elites held strategic positions such as the commander in chief of the Armed Forces led by Leonardus Benjamin Moerdani and in the economic field led by Radius Prawiro and J.B. Sumarlin. This had increasingly created a perception among Moslems that the government had actively marginalized Moslems. (R. W. Hefner, 2016).

Then rumours also developed that within the Armed Forces, there was a barrier to rank promotion for soldiers who obeyed praying or fasting and there was even a prohibition for soldiers to pray and use the Islamic greeting "Salaam Aleikum". Meanwhile in the economic field, Christian ministers deliberately issued several economic policies such as the October 1988 Package which provided great opportunities for Chinese conglomerates (non-Moslems) who were considered by many at that time to have low nationalism. On the other hand, other non-mainstream Moslem factions are supported by the government and spread widely without objection. The Indonesian Islamic Da'wah Institute (LDII), which is the religious wing of Golkar - the party in power is suspected of deliberately appearing to weaken the power of Islam.

The government's efforts to castrate Islam as a political force bore fruit in the late 1970s and early 1980s after the implementation of the Single Principle. However, in the 1990s the popularity of Islam as a source of guidance for social, ethnic, and spiritual life began to increase with the source of inspiration coming from the success of the Islamic Revolution in Iran (Schwarz, 1999, p. 73). Moslem activists from both secular and Moslem groups continued to deteriorate with Suharto's fall. (Bertrand, 2004, p. 217).

After the mass riots and reforms in 1998, many Islamic societies revitalized their understanding of their former faith. Some of them corrected their stereotyped conceptions of the Chinese. They are not always wrong or do unwise things like conglomerates. Chinese New Year celebrations or Barongsay festivals which were not allowed in the Soeharto era were appreciated and can be seen in several cities. However, on the other hand, some Moslem communities were increasingly behaving "extremely" due to the civil war in Ambon. Information that was being revealed about the origin of the riots was the attack on the Moslem community who were praying for Eid al-Fitr and then killed on a large scale by Christians. Some Moslems believed that the government was making no serious effort to protect the Moslem community. This gave rise to Laskar Jihad from Java as well as other areas to join the war in Maluku.

The situation of disillusionment with the government was then compounded by the development of a global ideology of an exclusive Moslem brotherhood. Namely, some groups claim that non-Moslems commit violence against Moslems. This fact was also supported by Islamic tragedies in Bosnia, Iraq, and other regions. As a result, some Moslems in Indonesia have responded through acts of terrorism such as the bombs in Bali, several churches, the Australian Embassy, and the J.W. Marriott Building. They did not trust officials and apparatus as their legitimate leaders, so they needed a Khilafah in Indonesia. However, the result of disappointment with the government had generated a lot of anti-certainty from the public, which is reflected in the enthusiasm of the local people to burn the bodies of terrorists who were shot by anti-terrorism special forces. However, this incident only increased the resistance of members of radical groups.

On the other hand, nationalist groups were not completely loyal to the Republic of Indonesia. With the threat of a communist revival since 2012, several descendants of the PKI had won strategic positions in parliament or in the government executive, and their flags and symbols have been raised in numerous cities in Indonesia. Another potential crack in the nation was the conglomerates' doubts about their nationalism towards Indonesia. This could be seen in several high-profile corruptors from citizens of descent who fled from Indonesia.

5. A long journey

Dutch colonialism created internal conflicts at the local level or used native people to trick their leaders into arrest. Or in many cases, such as in Banten, Central Java, Ternate & Tidore, some bourgeoisie asked the Dutch for help to defeat their competitors. The bourgeoisie gave wealth and concessions to the Dutch without considering outsiders expanding their territory.

When Japan expanded its expansion into the Southeast Asian region, Indonesia, which was under Dutch occupation, on March 8, 1942, the Indonesian people welcomed its presence as a liberator. However, they soon realized that it was only an illusion because Japan brutally and ruthlessly exploited natural and human resources. Indonesia which causes suffering. This situation changed when Japan was pushed on various battle fronts by the US alliance. They began to support Indonesian independence, hoping to make Indonesia their ally. Learning from previous experiences, two days after Japan surrendered on August 17, Sukarno and Hatta, with the support of the youth, immediately declared Indonesia's independence as an independent country.

There were several arguments from people who believed that Indonesia was founded on Moslems' sweat, blood, and sacrifice (Noer, 1982). In particular, the Islamic Trade Union (SDI), established on October 16, 1905, under the leadership of HOS Tjokroaminoto, inspired many Indonesian citizens who had been oppressed by the Dutch. This made some Moslems confused and wondering why Moslems' contribution to gaining independence and then expelling the Dutch from the archipelago seemed to have been forgotten and not appreciated.

Some Moslems considered it a religious duty to pursue the establishment of a government based on Qur'anic precepts making Islam not so different from communism or secularism, in which followers strive to achieve political victory in order to implement their vision of a 'just' society (Formichi, 2021). Therefore, as stated by Elson (2008) related to existing history, some groups feel that Islam has great rights in political life. In other words (Noer, 1982; R. W. Hefner, 2016) debate it with the question "Is Indonesian nationalism an Islamic nationalism that should be fought for?"

On the other hand, other new Islamic groups emerged and some of them were cross-country solidarity groups such as Jamaah Tabligh, Hizbut Tahrir, and Salafi. At the same time, the feeling of unease within the Islamic community that had existed before increased as radical groups developed in response to Christian expansion. (Hasani & Naipospos, 2010, p. 161-198). Then, Setara Institute noted that radical Islamic groups wanted to enforce sharia (Hasani & Naipospos, 2010 p. 115). Inferiority Complex was reflected in the feeling of being treated unfairly which had become a nightmare for some Moslem community groups. This condition was getting bigger along with the marginality of Islamic parties in political and economic issues on the national stage. This feeling was not only caused by domestic cases but also by global injustices for Moslem communities, especially in Palestine, Lebanon, Bosnia, Chechnya, Iraq, Myanmar, and others. All of this had created discomfort for the majority of Moslems and has even created aggressiveness – “terrorism” for a few parties.

The millennial period marked by the digital era has brought changes in many ways, including national issues. Local issues can become big problems on a national scale, such as issues in the election for the governor of DKI Jakarta in 2016-2017 or even the emergence of the term "cebong-kampret" related to fanatical supporters in the 2015-2018 RI presidential election. Both cases always have Islamic groups as one of the contestants.

Based on the description above, the map of Indonesian national issues can be seen in the following table:

Table 2. The Journey of Moslems in Indonesia

Era	Political issue	Socio-cultural	Economic affairs
7 – 16 centuries	The glories of Sriwijaya and Majapahit empire	Hindu – Budha tradition	Hindu – Budha tradition
16 – 18 centuries	Decline of Hindu's Kingdoms and the raise of Sultanates	Syncretic: Islam, Hindu, Budha Christian entrance	Dominated by Islamic traders in local business but controlled by Portuguese, Spain & VOC in international trade
1816 – 1942 Netherlands India Territorial	Dutch occupation, Islamic movement, and the struggle for independence	Moslem identically with the native & poor	Ruled by Dutch
1942 - 1945	Japanese occupation Moslem leaders were existing	Full oppressed by Japanese	Ruled by Japan
1945 - 1965	Soekarno regime, Rebellion of PKI Islam tried to exist	Exercised to blend communist and Islam	Native/Moslem were preference
1966 1998	Soeharto regime, Islam was pressed	Throw out the Islamic interest	Chinese conglomerates spring, At the end, Soeharto gave a little bit opportunity to Islam
Post Reformasi	Many factions in Moslem organizations/ parties. The risen feeling of new colonized	Globalization era. The risen of new Islamic tradition. The digital era.	The massive expansion of capitalism and liberalization The rise of economic sharia

Source: author, summarized from various sources

Islam and nationality could not be separated from the big ideas in the state design built by the founding fathers. Bertrand (2004. p. 28-29) showed that there were at least three

controversial issues that characterize the debate about the national model principles in Indonesia. First, the disagreement between inclusion and exclusion criteria. The increase in religion-based sentiment created conflict and violence based on primordial issues. (Brown & Wilson, 2007) In an extreme case, the New Order regime carried out discriminatory policies against ethnic minorities, especially the Chinese. Although several groups officially claim to be Indonesian citizens, "backward" groups were marginalized. Schwarz (1999, p. 129) argued that the Suharto regime succeeded in assimilating the Chinese minority into Indonesian citizens. The encouraging thing was that calls for Chinese people to return to China had not been heard. This was often expressed during the Old Order era in the 1960s. Mixed marriages were common, and the younger Chinese showed less primordial traits so the process of social integration with the native majority was relatively easy. Under the leadership of Abdurahman and Megawati, the Chinese had become Indonesians.

Second, the role of implementing Islamic values was still controversial. Several groups wish to purify Islamic teachings (Heryanto, 2018) including criteria for adherence to Islam as a national model. However, other groups were more inclined to support an inclusive national model that will be fully adopted by Islam as proclaimed by President Soekarno through the Nasakom ideology (Fogg, 2019). Third, many struggles involved representatives of various ethnic groups and interest groups. They fight against existing authorities and resources to express the preservation of their culture, such as the Darul Islam movement led by Kartosuwiryo (Formichi, 2021).

Merlyna Lim (2017) added another significant issue, namely how the atmosphere generates information, especially through the use of social media. This had become a means of individual and group expression. Weak government control had encouraged widespread hate speech, causing conflict and social segregation within Indonesian society to increase. Aspinall (2016) stated that the reshaping of nationalism created today was based on economic, social, and cultural developments. Especially the existence of sentiments that stimulate new nationalism such as the existence of unilateral claims from Malaysia on various products that have become Indonesian cultural traditions.

The new nationalism is a product of democratization since 1998 which is reflected in positive social and cultural dynamics. This was also cited by Warburton (2018) who stated that the absence of dominant political parties and a populist political system had made an important contribution in alleviating tensions that existed in society. However, democratization has not been fully implemented. (Aspinall et al., 2020). As stated by Schwarz (1999) that Indonesia is a nation in waiting because there are still many factions and interests ready to take advantage of opportunities for their interests. Therefore, the level of maturity in the life of the nation and state is something that is absolute

6. Discussion & Conclusion

Looking back at the historical facts, it can be seen that there is no dominant culture that is followed by all people in Indonesia. Even though since the 19th century, Islam has become the majority religion in the archipelago, there are still many who have various interpretations of verses and traditions that often conflict with each other. (Chaplin, 2018; R. W. Hefner, 2016). Until now, Islamic values have not become a common language among Moslem communities. Different understandings and in some parts contradictions between them such as the basis of the Indonesian state; secular, sharia, or Pancasila. The Moslem community has various interpretations of Islam ranging from liberals who want a secular state; moderates who accept Pancasila to fundamentalists who want to continue to follow a religious way of life (R. Hefner, 2000).

On the other hand, the nationalist groups that are followed by adherents of Islam and Christianity also have many viewpoints; returning to Marhaen ideology, strengthening secular ideology through marginalizing Islamic values, or remaining secular by accommodating Islamic culture and possibly other controversies; as well as the issue of the return of the Indonesian Communist Party. Possibly hidden, but very powerful, is real nationalism above capital or business. This is the challenge for the nationalists to serve the Republic as the entire Indonesian nation and not for the petty interests of the free riders.

Regarding nation development, identity is the most significant thing. (Smith, 2001). Without a common identity, people cannot form a great nation. History has proven that the rise and fall of emperors in the world was preceded by the loss of shared identity among its inhabitants, and that happened in the contemporary era. There is no strong country without a strong identity. Identity cannot be defined in individuals or groups but as a result between

people or groups and in social relations (Lawler, 2008). Adnan (2013) identified several leaders from certain islands who were arrested by the Dutch military and sent to other islands. Sultan Haji Muhammad Usman Syah from Ternate (Maluku) was expelled to Bandung (West Java), Prince Diponegoro from Central Java was deposed to Maluku, then North Sulawesi and then South Sulawesi, Tuanku Imam Bonjol from West Sumatra was sent to Minahasa, Ratu Langie from North Sulawesi sent to prison in Suka Miskin (Bandung) then expelled to Makassar then to Serui (Papua), Soekarno (leader from Java) was transferred to Ende (Timor), Bangka (South Sumatra) then Bengkulu, Muhammad Hatta and Sutan Syahrir from West Sumatra who was a political figure in Java exiled to Boven Digul (Papua) then sent to Banda Neira (Maluku), and there were many other cases.

Fukuyama (1995. p. 9) argues that in all successful economies, people are held together by trust. As stated by Castells (2010) that trust can be developed from a sense of identity among community members. Almost all Indonesians believe that "we have the same history, namely having been colonized by the Dutch and Japanese" so people feel that "we are one nation, one country, and one identity". This shared value builds an integrated society as a nation and is an important capital for developing this country. Social virtues, including honesty, reliability, cooperation, and a sense of responsibility for others, are essential for fostering togetherness. (Fukuyama, 1995. p. 43).

Moreover, Indonesians have a good sense of tolerance and mutual understanding, especially as shown by the two oldest and largest Islamic organizations in Indonesia; Muhammadiyah and Nahdhatul Ulama (Hefner, R. W., 2016). As a pluralistic society, the ancestors of the Indonesian people taught them how to live easily. History has proven that many imported religions: Buddhism, Hinduism, Islam, and Christianity have come and flourished in this region peacefully for more than 10 centuries. More than half of Indonesians who speak Javanese have accepted Malay since 1928 (Sumpah Pemuda). Another proof is the fact that in 1945 as the youngest country, most Islamic leaders finally agreed to remove the seven words in the first line of the Pancasila which mention the obligation to carry out Islamic religious law. This fact differs from the argument of Castells (2010. p.7.) that identities can also originate from dominant institutions, and they become identities only when and if social actors internalize them and build their meaning around these internalizations.

The Indonesian nation as a pluralistic society has many experiences in living together and also has several capitals to become one great nation-state. Today's challenges are: first, how can the Islamic and Nationalist wings form a joint commitment to live as one Indonesian nation? That is, both of them must respect each other and minimize insults or feelings of harassment. More than that, they must make a joint strategy to build Indonesia as a strong country in the world. Second, to implement it, every group in Indonesia should create and build a shared culture shared by the majority population.

Third, this study also strengthens the argument of Lindsay (2000. p. 282) which stated that culture is a significant aspect of a nation's ability to achieve prosperity because culture shapes individual thoughts about risks, rewards, and opportunities. One aspect of culture that builds shared identity between community members is language. And Indonesia has it: Bahasa Indonesia. In addition, Indonesians must leave behind bad habits that are as divisive as their ancestors and prefer to give more to outsiders than to share among themselves.

Fourth, the Indonesian must be able to control liberalism which in many ways gives freedom to anyone to voice their aspirations and even utter hate speech as stated by Lim (2017). Indonesians have to be mature in more and more complicated world life. The digital era, which allows various things to spread so quickly and massively without being able to be controlled by an institution, including the state, can only be used positively by the maturity of its citizens. Namely, with identity as a great nation in the midst of existing pluralism.

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