

# Refugee Inflow and Islamophobia in Germany Post 2015: A Descriptive Analysis by Using Anti-Muslim Hate-Crime Indicators

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## ABSTRACT

Existing studies on post-2015 backlash in Germany often rely on broad xenophobia indicators, which can conflate Islamophobia with general anti-immigrant hostility. This study documents whether anti Muslim hate crime shows a distinct post-2017 trajectory using the official 'islamfeindlich' category. Using a qualitative-descriptive design grounded in the qualitative description approach, the study combines descriptive trend analysis of BKA/PMK "islamfeindlich" data for 2017–2024 with narrative synthesis of OSCE/ODIHR hate crime reports, the UEM expert report, and comparative research on the 2015/16 inflow and social cohesion. Guided by Group Threat Theory and the Islamophobia framework, the analysis shows that official "islamfeindlich" statistics reveal a persistently high and recently intensifying pattern of anti-Muslim incidents from 2017 to 2024, indicating that the short-term anti-immigrant backlash triggered by the 2015–2016 refugee inflow indicates a sustained pattern of religion-specific hostility directed at Muslims. Implications: The study highlights the need for precise outcome measures and supports policy interventions such as routine protection of mosques, targeted anti-bias and media literacy programs, and improved reporting mechanisms that link administrative and civil society monitoring.

*Keyword: Islamophobia; Anti-Muslim Hate-Crime; Refugee; Group Threat Theory; Civil Society*

## ABSTRAK

*Studi-studi yang ada tentang reaksi balik pasca-2015 di Jerman sering mengandalkan indikator xenofobia yang luas, yang dapat mencampuradukkan Islamofobia dengan kebencian umum terhadap imigran. Studi ini mendokumentasikan apakah kejahatan kebencian terhadap*

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Muslim menunjukkan tren yang berbeda pasca-2017 dengan menggunakan kategori resmi 'islamfeindlich'. Menggunakan desain kualitatif-deskriptif yang didasarkan pada pendekatan deskripsi kualitatif, studi ini menggabungkan analisis tren deskriptif data "islamfeindlich" BKA/PMK untuk periode 2017–2024 dengan sintesis naratif laporan kejahatan kebencian OSCE/ODIHR, laporan ahli UEM, dan penelitian komparatif tentang arus masuk 2015/16 dan kohesi sosial. Dipandu oleh Group Threat Theory dan kerangka kerja Islamofobia, analisis menunjukkan bahwa statistik resmi "islamfeindlich" mengungkapkan pola insiden anti-Muslim yang tinggi dan semakin intensif dari 2017 hingga 2024. Reaksi balik anti-imigran jangka pendek yang dipicu oleh arus masuk pengungsi 2015–2016 mengindikasikan pola permusuhan berbasis agama yang berkelanjutan terhadap Muslim. Implikasi: Studi ini menyoroti kebutuhan akan ukuran hasil yang akurat dan mendukung intervensi kebijakan seperti perlindungan rutin masjid, program anti-diskriminasi dan literasi media yang ditargetkan, serta mekanisme pelaporan yang ditingkatkan yang menghubungkan pemantauan administratif dan masyarakat sipil.

**Kata Kunci:** Islamofobia; Kejahatan Kebencian Anti-Muslim; Pengungsi; Group Threat Theory; Masyarakat Sipil.

## 1. Introduction

Forced migration worldwide has surged in the past ten years, resulting in unprecedented levels of cross-border movement and altering the political landscape within numerous host countries. By 2015, the scale of global migration was unparalleled, and Europe saw a particularly significant surge, with over a million refugees and migrants entering the continent that year (T. Schilling et al., 2017). This broader background is important since the European experience, especially after 2015, has frequently been viewed as a major test of societal unity and the relationships between different groups across Europe (Desmond, 2023).

In 2015, almost one million refugees and migrants arrived in Europe by sea, primarily through Greece and Italy (Clayton & Holland, 2015). Germany subsequently documented the largest number of initial asylum applications within the EU (Eurostat, 2016). These two facts underpin the empirical conundrum addressed in this work. Existing research shows that the refugee inflow was followed by measurable social and political consequences: Albarosa & Elsner (2023) research, a short-term surge in anti-immigrant violence, while Torres (2023) finds that national concerns about immigration increased, even though local exposure sometimes reduced fear through contact.

Yet these findings are limited by their reliance on broad indicators such as "anti-immigrant violence" or "immigration concerns." Because most of the 2015 arrivals were Muslims (Eurostat, 2016). It is plausible that hostility manifested not only as generic xenophobia but also as *Islamophobia*. Islamophobia, defined as prejudice, discrimination, or violence against Muslims as a religious group (Bleich 2011; Allen 2011), leading to this focused empirical question: do officially recorded Islam-targeted offenses in Germany display a trend pattern distinguishable from broader xenophobic hostility in the post-2015 context?

Until recently, empirical analysis of Islamophobia in Germany was hampered by the absence of reliable data. This changed in 2017, when Germany's Federal Criminal Police Office (Bundeskriminalamt, BKA) introduced a dedicated subcategory "islamfeindlich" within its politically motivated crime statistics (Politisch Motivierte Kriminalität, PMK).

In 2017, a federal response to Parliament indicated 1,075 offenses motivated by Islamophobia. In 2018, the same series documented 910 incidents, including assaults on mosques (BMI, 2019). For 2019, reports from the Interior Ministry, as reported on specialized platforms, indicate approximately 950 infractions, citing the foundational BMI tables (Bundesministerium des Inneren, 2020). In 2020, two amounts were reported at separate times: a preliminary estimate of "at least 901" and a subsequent consolidated total of 1,026, following adjustments, as indicated in the BMI's PMK 2020 documents (Fallzahlen, 2021). In 2021, the BMI's Hasskriminalität factsheet documented 732 incidents categorized under the islamfeindlich subtopic and included them in the yearly PMK table (Bundesministerium, 2022). In 2022, the BMI factsheet recorded 610 offenses, while in 2023, the figure escalated significantly to 1,464, with the BKA and BMI releasing the relevant national factsheets (the ODIHR also aggregates Germany's hate crime data for triangulation purposes) (BMI & BKA, 2023). Finally, for 2024, the Interior Ministry's factsheet reports increased totals of

“Hasskriminalität” and presents the latest breakdown of islamophobic incidents, totaling 1,848 violations for the year, pending subsequent revisions (BMI, 2024). This category offers a comprehensive assessment of anti-Muslim hate crimes, encompassing incidents from mosque attacks to verbal harassment, hence yielding a precise result for this study. To anchor the measurement in verifiable records, Table 1 reports annual counts for PMK-islamfeindlich (2017–2024).

Table 1. Islamophobic Crimes in PMK “Islamfeindlich,” Germany, 2017-2024

Year	PMK-islamfeindlich (offenses)
2017	1,075
2018	910
2019	950
2020	1,026
2021	732
2022	610
2023	1,464
2024	1,848

Sources: 2017–2018: Deutscher Bundestag, Drucksachen 19/11513 & 19/11990. 2019: BMI overview for Hasskriminalität (2001–2019). 2020–2021: BMI/BKA PMK releases and factsheets. 2022: BMI PMK 2022 factsheet. 2023: BMI PMK 2023 factsheets. 2024: BMI PMK 2024 factsheet.

This article addresses that gap. By descriptively analyzing Islamophobic crime trends between 2017–2024 and situating them within the refugee inflow context, the study makes three contributions: (1) it emphasizes the need for outcome precision by focusing on Muslim-specific hostility; (2) it utilizes a new measurement window provided by official statistics; and (3) it demonstrates the policy relevance of disaggregating Islamophobia from general xenophobia.

To make those contributions operational, we first clarify what we measure, which sources we use, and why this choice improves precision over broader proxies. This article utilizes PMK statistics with the islamfeindlich subcategory, reported nationally in official releases, rather than broad attitudinal indicators, and offers a time series from 2017 to 2024 (BMI, 2024). The most recent BMI papers feature a “Hasskriminalität” table that enumerates annual statistics for the subfield of Islamophobia from 2017 to 2024, facilitating an accurate assessment of anti-Muslim hate crimes (BMI & BKA, 2023; BMI, 2024). The PMK 2023 factsheet presents the distribution and trends of occurrences by subfield, including anti-Islamic incidents, facilitating comparisons with other PMK domains (BMI & BKA, 2023). For cross-source triangulation, we reference the OSCE/ODIHR Hate Crime Reporting for Germany and the UEM expert report inside the Deutsche Islam Konferenz, which delineates anti-Muslim sentiment and provides policy suggestions (OSCE/ODIHR, 2023; Expertenkreis Muslimfeindlichkeit, 2023).

Because these are administrative series, we also pre-specify interpretive cautions to avoid overclaiming single-year levels. Interpreting PMK trends necessitates two considerations. Initially, statistics may fluctuate due to Nachmeldungen and Abschlussmeldungen from the Länder under the KPMD-PMK framework; official announcements indicate that totals may be revised (BMI, 2024). The reporting practice permits Nachtragsmeldungen when new information arises during investigations, making post-publication corrections a standard procedure as outlined in the KPMD-PMK advice (Bundeskriminalamt (BKA), 2022). Secondly, PMK is an administrative (input) statistic that is influenced by definitions, reporting capabilities, and the late-stage identification of political motives; thus, we regard the series as a baseline, institutionalized record, and focus on year-to-year variations and inflection points rather than individual year estimates (BMI, 2024; OSCE/ODIHR, 2023).

## 2. Theoretical Review

The problems presented in the introduction indicate two interconnected processes. The 2015 influx of refugees resulted in a swift and conspicuous demographic transformation, prompting inquiries into the responses of host cultures to abrupt population changes (Liebe et al., 2018; Hangartner et al., 2019). Conversely, event patterns that disproportionately affect Muslims indicate that public responses are not merely general but can be specifically aimed at a particular religious outgroup when identity cues are prominent (Helbling & Traunmuller, 2020; Czymara et al., 2023). The analysis necessitates a theoretical foundation that elucidates the formation of heightened animosity and its particular trajectory.

Consequently, the subsequent section links these preliminary insights to two complementary foundations. Group Threat Theory posits that the 2015 influx constitutes a demographic shock capable of eliciting perceptions of economic, cultural, and security threats within the majority population, particularly at periods of heightened public and political significance (Hainmueller & Hopkins, 2014; Müller & Schwarz, 2021). Islamophobia, as a specific phenomenon, elucidates why generalized anxiety is frequently directed disproportionately against Muslims when religion serves as a significant boundary marker in public discourse (Bleich, 2011; Helbling & Traummüller, 2020; Czymara et al., 2023).

The study applies Islamfeindlich (Islam-targeted) hate-crime statistics as the primary outcome and broader xenophobia indicators as comparators to evaluate whether the increases observed post-2015 primarily signify a generalized threat or a specifically Muslim-directed trend (Müller & Schwarz, 2021; Liebe et al., 2018). The Theoretical Framework connects the research questions to the literature, generates testable hypotheses throughout time, and informs the selection of the most pertinent indicators for addressing them.

### **2.1. Group threat theory**

Blalock and Quillian contend that prejudice and animosity escalate when dominant groups view minorities as threats to economic, cultural, or security interests (Blalock, 1967; Quillian, 1995). Substantial refugee influxes amplify the prominence of minority groups and may incite apprehensions regarding cultural dilution, rivalry for resources, or safety concerns. The 2015 influx of refugees into Germany, predominantly Muslim, exemplifies a demographic shock that is likely to heighten threat perceptions among native Germans. Subsequent studies post-2015 indicate a transition from a "welcome culture" to "welcome limits," aligning with both symbolic and realistic competition (Liebe et al., 2018; Hainmueller & Hopkins, 2014).

In addition to attitudinal shifts, threat amplification functions through political and media prominence. Empirical research from Germany indicates that increased exposure to anti-refugee sentiment online is associated with a rise in hate crimes against refugees, suggesting that digital signals can convert perceived threats into aggressive behaviors (Müller & Schwarz, 2021). At the macro-political level, substantial inflows correlate with increased backing for right-wing, anti-immigration parties, so reinforcing incentives and narratives that perpetuate group-threat dynamics (Halla et al., 2017). Panel research from a nearby context similarly indicates that direct exposure to the refugee crisis heightens anti-immigrant sentiments and bolsters support for exclusionary policies, providing an external reference point for Germany (Hangartner et al., 2019).

### **2.2. Islamophobia as a distinct phenomenon**

Although Group Threat Theory elucidates the emergence of antagonism, it fails to identify the specific targets of such animosity. The literature on Islamophobia posits that animosity against Muslims intertwines migration-related apprehension with religious prejudice, frequently linking Islam to terrorism, patriarchal ideologies, or cultural discordance. It is essential to differentiate Islamophobia from general xenophobia, both theoretically and experimentally. Comparative studies indicate that anti-Muslim prejudice is a different dimension from general anti-immigrant attitude, particularly when religious identity serves as a significant social border in public discourse (Helbling & Traummüller, 2020; Bleich, 2011).

Empirical research indicates that spikes in online hate following security-salient events, such as terrorist incidents and extensive media coverage, direct generalized anxiety specifically towards Muslims, resulting in targeted surges that are not uniformly distributed across different groups (Czymara et al., 2023). In Germany, empirical evidence regarding digital platforms indicates that anti-refugee and anti-Islam narratives can resonate and manifest as hate incidents, corroborating the hypothesis that the prominence of religious identity intensifies the targeting of Muslims beyond general xenophobia (Müller & Schwarz, 2021). Simultaneously, local perspectives and community standards influence refugee integration and the overarching social environment faced by Muslim populations, providing a framework to analyze regional discrepancies in the medium-term expressions of Islamophobia (P. Schilling & Stillman, 2024; Schilling & Stillman, 2024).

The article integrates group threat theory with Islamophobia studies to conceive the 2015 refugee influx as a catalyst for widespread xenophobia, which has enduring effects predominantly aimed at Muslims. This paradigm validates the utilization of "islamfeindlich"

crime statistics as a definitive outcome variable and situates the study within wider discussions on migration, religion, and hate crime.

### 3. Method

This study employs a qualitative-descriptive design, grounded in the qualitative description approach, to provide a low-inference, data-driven account of Islamophobia dynamics in Germany since 2017. Current guidance designates qualitative description as suitable for systematically summarizing patterned occurrences without extensive theorization, while associating patterns with mid-range theory (Hall & Liebenberg, 2024; Colorafi & Evans, 2016). We implement qualitative description through clear audit trails and transparent narrative synthesis, adhering to methodical exemplars (Villamin et al., 2025). This research is observational and descriptive in design. It neither estimates causal effects nor tests causal links between refugee influx and Islamophobic occurrences.

We utilize secondary data from: (a) the BKA/PMK official series (2017–2024) about Islamophobic offenses; (b) OSCE/ODIHR hate crime reports for Germany; (c) the UEM Expert Report (BMI & BKA, 2023), and (d) peer-reviewed comparative studies on the 2015/16 influx and societal attitudes. Recent methodological research indicates that secondary analysis can be both efficient and rigorous when researchers predefine inquiries, establish data provenance, and ensure that transformations from raw data to analytic presentations are auditable (Kelly et al., 2024). Comparative studies offer contextual anchors and moderators pertinent to our understanding of administrative trends, e.g., World Development on forced migration and social cohesion in Germany (Albarosa & Elsner, 2023), Journal of the European Economic Association on social media cues and hate crime (Müller & Schwarz, 2021), and Labour Economics on the influence of local political climates on refugee integration (P. Schilling & Stillman, 2024).

Administrative hate-crime series are essential yet vulnerable to issues of definition, classification, and reporting impacts. To address this, we (i) synchronize category selections with a recent systematic study of hate crime and hate speech definitions and metrics (Vergani et al., 2024); and (ii) corroborate PMK counts using ODIHR records and civil society contributions to verify face validity and trend direction. Triangulation is a methodologically advocated approach in modern qualitative and case-oriented research, used to enhance both credibility and comprehension of divergent sources (Farquhar et al., 2020). Event-linked spikes may distort annual patterns; therefore, we annotate them with evidence indicating that security-salient shocks induce targeted increases in online hostility (Czymara et al., 2023). We interpret yearly fluctuations as shapes (levels, inflection points) rather than discrete point estimates, aligning with the qualitative description's focus on structured analysis.

Initially, we record trends in Islam-targeted incidents (2017–2024) utilizing straightforward graphics (lines, year-over-year changes) and concise narrative summaries, a technique consistent with the qualitative description focus on clarity and organization (Hall & Liebenberg, 2024). Secondly, we evaluate specificity by contrasting Islamophobic outcomes with wider xenophobia metrics and examining divergence/convergence in the context of media and political prominence, guided by causal evidence regarding social media mobilization and hate crimes (Müller & Schwarz, 2021) as well as Germany-specific research connecting the 2015/16 influx to social cohesion (Albarosa & Elsner, 2023). Third, we derive policy implications contingent upon local contexts: in areas with stronger right-populist environments, integration is diminished and harassment risks are elevated (P. Schilling & Stillman, 2024) indicating the need for specific prevention and communication initiatives.

Our assertions are descriptive rather than causative. We do not assess treatment effects; rather, we analyze pattern forms using theory-consistent modifiers (salience, local norms/attitudes). To improve external sense-making without excessive generalization, we contextualize German patterns with recent European findings regarding event-driven animosity (Czymara et al., 2023) and, when pertinent, limited exposure to migrants.

## 4. Results And Discussion

### 4.1. Trends in Anti-Muslim Hate Crimes (2017–2024)

Table 1 as mentioned above, presents the PMK statistics from 2017 to 2024, detailing annual counts of politically motivated offenses categorized as islamfeindlich. In the inaugural year of the series, 2017, there were 1,075 infractions, followed by 910 offenses in 2018, 950 offenses in 2019, and 1,026 offenses in 2020. Following a decline to 732 in 2021 and 610 in 2022, the population is projected to rise to 1,464 in 2023 and 1,848 in 2024. These data may be revised

in future releases via routine reporting changes. The data was obtained from federal PMK fact sheets. The minimum annual count is 610 in 2022, while the maximum count is 1,848 in 2024. Between 2018 and 2022, there is a minimal variation from year to year. Subsequently, there is a notable escalation from 2022 to 2023, followed by a further increase from 2023 to 2024.

This discussion interprets the observed pattern in Table 1 in light of the article's core question on how refugee inflow and subsequent political and social dynamics relate to Islamophobia in Germany. The descriptive series shows that a post-2017 decline does not translate into sustained de-escalation. Instead, the sharp rise in 2023 and 2024 indicates that Islam-targeted hostility can re-intensify even after the peak years of the 2015 to 2016 refugee arrivals.

At the same time, several alternative explanations must be considered. Because the PMK series is administrative, year-to-year variations can be affected by reporting propensity, classification practices, investigative completion, and late registrations, as noted in the methodology section. A second counterpoint is that part of the increase may reflect improved visibility and willingness to report, rather than a pure increase in underlying incidents. To address these counterpoints, the paper treats the PMK counts as an indicator of recorded offenses and triangulates the trend with qualitative narratives and civil society monitoring that captures a wider spectrum of non-criminal harassment and threats.

#### **4.2. Refugee inflow and social backlash in Germany, 2015 and 2016**

Germany had a significant influx of asylum seekers in 2015 and 2016, which some analysts characterize as a demographic and political upheaval (Gallegos Torres, 2023). A growing body of peer-reviewed research employs reliable identification methodologies to assess the impact of this influx on violence against immigrants, attitudes toward immigration, and electoral outcomes. A prevailing consensus suggests that social reactions occurred; however, their magnitude and duration vary by location and temporal context. The backlash was especially apparent in two areas. Initially, there was a quantifiable increase in anti-immigrant violence, particularly in the early years following immigration and in regions with pre-existing risk indicators, such as elevated unemployment and a more pronounced far-right presence (Albarosa & Elsner, 2023). Secondly, electoral backing for the extreme right intensified in certain contexts, particularly where political figures and local media emphasized immigration and security issues (Fremerey et al., 2024). These findings substantiate the assertion that the influx initiated a trajectory toward social backlash, which subsequently manifested as targeted animosity toward Muslims, as elaborated in Points 2 and 3 (Gallegos Torres, 2023).

A significant methodological advancement is the application of German allocation laws for asylum applicants, which closely resemble an exogenous assignment to municipalities and counties. By utilizing this semi-random assignment, researchers can assess the causal impacts of local exposure to new immigrants. Findings from a nationwide study indicate that locales accommodating a greater number of asylum seekers encountered elevated instances of anti-immigrant violence, particularly assaults on housing facilities, with the most pronounced effects occurring within the initial two years following the influx, and more significant impacts observed in regions with elevated unemployment and increased support for right-wing political parties (Albarosa & Elsner, 2023). Prominent occurrences that intensified perceptions of danger, exemplified by the extensively covered New Year incident in Cologne at the transition from 2015 to 2016, exacerbated these reactions by redirecting public focus towards security frameworks and reinforcing narratives of risk (Gallegos Torres, 2023).

The backlash is both behavioral and political. Detailed analyses of local exposure to refugee accommodations indicate that proximity to such facilities correlates with increased support for the far right in the 2017 Federal Election, with effects varying by location and being more pronounced in areas with weaker labor markets or where the far right already had a presence (Fremerey et al., 2024). This pattern supports the assertion that social backlash is contingent upon context rather than being automatic, and that political entrepreneurs can exploit threat perceptions when the opportunity structure is advantageous (Fremerey et al., 2024).

The evidence about public opinion is complex. National-level assessments reveal that post-2015, concerns regarding immigration significantly escalated, and support for extreme right parties increased marginally, a trend aligned with heightened issue salience rather than a fundamental shift in core values (Gallegos Torres, 2023). Additional research examines whether local interaction with immigrants diminishes fear, as anticipated by traditional contact theory. A study using proximity to accommodation facilities indicates a definitive null influence on

typical local attitudes toward refugees, implying that mere geographic closeness, devoid of structured or positive interaction, is inadequate to alter perceptions (Schmidt et al., 2024). This article concludes that contact can alleviate fear under some settings, although its impact is limited and dependent on the quality of interaction and local norms, rather than simply the presence of proximity (Schmidt et al., 2024).

A pertinent inquiry is whether local exposure to anti-refugee hate crimes alters public sentiment towards refugees. Recent municipal-level research indicates no direct average effect of exposure to anti-refugee hate crimes on support for refugees, suggesting that even significant negative incidents do not deterministically alter public opinion (Kuhn & Maxwell, 2025). Responses are influenced by local narratives, media focus, and existing political ideologies, substantiating the assertion that backlash is not merely a numerical phenomenon but is contingent upon framing and institutional reactions (Kuhn & Maxwell, 2025; Gallegos Torres, 2023).

It is beneficial to distinguish between actual crime statistics and perceived insecurity. Studies utilizing administrative data indicate that some types of reported crime may correlate with population influx; however, careful interpretation is essential due to the influence of the arriving population's composition, reporting behaviors, policing goals, and baseline trends on inferences (Lange & Sommerfeld, 2024). Perceived insecurity can escalate more rapidly than actual crime, particularly when a limited number of prominent episodes overshadow the information landscape. The disparity between perception and reality elucidates why anti-immigrant violence may escalate prior to the stabilization of attitudes or the adjustment of institutional protection and communication, aligning with an initial surge followed by adaptation (Lange & Sommerfeld, 2024; Gallegos Torres, 2023).

What caused the initial surge of backlash followed by its subsequent drop in various regions? The salience adaptation framework serves as an effective guide. During the initial phase, the topic prevailed in public discourse, towns were in the process of enhancing accommodation and security, and signals from national authorities and the media were intense and frequently contradictory. Over time, administrative systems were enhanced, civil society mobilized support, and the focus was redirected to alternative challenges. While violence diminished in numerous regions, identity-based fault lines persisted and subsequently were more overtly associated with religious and cultural identifiers, linking to the ongoing anti-Muslim animosity post-2017, in the subsequent sections (Albarosa & Elsner, 2023; Gallegos Torres, 2023).

Context serves as the perpetual moderator. In regions with elevated unemployment, robust support for the extreme right, and local media prioritizing security narratives, the influx was more likely perceived as a threat, leading to mobilization or antagonistic actions. In areas with high social capital, where municipalities facilitated ongoing pleasant interactions and law enforcement promptly secured facilities, the backlash effects were less pronounced and of shorter duration (Albarosa & Elsner, 2023; Fremerey et al., 2024). This distributional logic necessitates policies grounded in risk and locality, as opposed to a uniform approach, and endorses subsequent recommendations for safeguarding places of worship, customized anti-bias education encompassing Islamophobia, and enhanced reporting mechanisms linking civil society with the state ((Schmidt et al., 2024; Kuhn & Maxwell, 2025).

The study should reference official and reputable statistical sources that quantify the magnitude of the inflow. Eurostat indicates that in 2016, Germany recorded approximately 722,000 first-time asylum applications, constituting roughly 60% of the European Union's total for that year. Both Eurostat and the European Union Agency for Asylum demonstrate that 2015 and 2016 collectively represented the zenith of first-time applications in the decade, with Germany as the principal destination (Eurostat, 2016). These descriptive facts do not independently show causality; however, they furnish critical context for the aforementioned causal research.

This is a brief summary of the section on the findings. During the years 2015 and 2016, Germany experienced a significant social backlash due to the extremely large and rapid influx of people seeking protection. It has been demonstrated that there is a correlation between increased local exposure and increased risks of anti-immigrant violence in the first years, and that there was a localized surge in support for the extreme right in 2017. There was not a consistent pattern of opinion shifts, and the mere proximity to accommodations did not result in different sentiments on average. The pattern is consistent with a salience-driven dynamic that eventually settles into identity-based lines of conflict. This is what motivates the

concentration on anti-Muslim animosity in the period beginning in 2017 (Albarosa & Elsner, 2023; Fremerey et al., 2024; Schmidt et al., 2024; Gallegos Torres, 2023).

Official statistical releases from governmental and EU sources provide a means to quantify asylum applications, arrivals, and allocation patterns. Such releases offer a framework for understanding the magnitude of the influx experienced in 2015 and 2016.

Overall, the data analyzed in this section indicate that the years 2015 and 2016 were characterized by considerable social and political disruption. Nevertheless, it is crucial to recognize that anti-Muslim sentiment should not be viewed as a transient outcome of peak immigration, considering its persistence and intensification beyond 2017.

### **4.3. Islamophobia as a distinct phenomenon**

Since 2017, Islamophobia in Germany has evolved from a transient response to migration levels into a persistent division rooted in religious identity and cultural symbols. Peer-reviewed research indicates three consistent patterns. Negative perceptions of Islam and Muslims are prevalent and systematically ingrained in German public opinion, exhibiting regional and contextual variability. Secondly, visibility indicators like headscarves render Muslim women particularly susceptible to routine harassment and systemic discrimination. Third, media focus and political framing maintain Islam as a prominent category even when migration rates decline, elucidating the endurance and resurgence of interest independent of general anti-immigrant trends (Kalter & Foroutan, 2021; Fernández-Reino et al., 2023; Richter & Paasch-Colberg, 2023).

Survey data positions Islamophobia within a wider framework of group-oriented animosity that persists in Germany. Kalter and colleagues demonstrate through extensive comparison data that anti-Muslim sentiment is consistently elevated in specific situations within Germany, with regional disparities reflecting enduring socio-historical reasons rather than transient disturbances. The findings suggest that animosity cannot be only attributed to religiosity; rather, it is associated with nativist threat perceptions and authoritarian tendencies, which remain consistent over time and differ by location (Kalter & Foroutan, 2021). These findings correspond with recent cross-national analyses that differentiate Islamophobia from general xenophobia by illustrating its close association with nativism and authoritarianism, rather than personal religiosity, thereby reinforcing the assertion that we are witnessing a unique attitudinal dimension (Arzheimer, 2025).

The visibility of religious identity serves as a crucial mechanism. Comprehensive audits and field experiments reveal that Muslim women who indicate their religious identification by wearing a headscarf encounter markedly reduced probabilities of earning interview callbacks in Germany. An experiment conducted by the European Sociological Review, which involved sending matching applications in Germany, the Netherlands, and Spain, reveals significant penalties associated with Muslim-coded names, particularly for applicants who wear veils, regardless of their qualifications. This penalty continues to exist in regulated professions and remains evident after accounting for employer and occupation fixed effects, indicating discrimination associated with religious identifiers rather than deficiencies in human capital (Fernández-Reino et al., 2023). Comparable findings emerge from German field trials and meta-analyses, indicating compounding disadvantages for women of Turkish descent who use headscarves, aligning with intersectional stigma rooted in both ethnicity and religion (Weichselbaumer, 2020). These studies emphasize the gendered nature of Islamophobia and the disproportionate targeting of visibly Muslim women in everyday contexts (Fernández-Reino et al., 2023; Weichselbaumer, 2020).

The mechanics of media further reinforce Islam as a cultural border. A longitudinal content analysis of eight German newspapers indicates that the portrayal of Islam consistently emphasizes issues, with a predominance of violence and conflict narratives, while the quotidian experiences of Muslims receive minimal coverage. This cycle endures from 2014 to 2019, fostering a discursive milieu where Islam is perpetually associated with security, radicalism, and societal discord (Richter & Paasch-Colberg, 2023). This coverage can amplify perceived cultural threats even amidst declining migrant figures, elucidating why animosity remains a religiously characterized issue rather than directly correlating with inflow data (Richter & Paasch-Colberg, 2023).

At the micro level, research indicates that Muslims experience heightened stigmatization after prominent security incidents, revealing that exposure to terrorism-related media content amplifies perceived stigma among Muslim minorities, subsequently leading to withdrawal from public spaces and anticipatory self-protection behaviors. These processes function via identity



threat rather than through tangible alterations in local crime, elucidating the discrepancies in reporting and the underregistration of routine harassment that fails to satisfy criminal criteria (Kaskeleviciute et al., 2025). The aforementioned field experimental data corroborates the notion that Islamophobia is manifested through symbolic cues and quotidian contacts, which are only partially reflected in official statistics (Fernández-Reino et al., 2023; Kaskeleviciute et al., 2025).

Ultimately, cross-national research suggests straightforward metrics for public awareness of Islamophobia that exhibit strong psychometric performance across European contexts, including Germany, and indicates that anti-Muslim prejudice is separate from general anti-immigrant attitude. These scales exhibit a stronger correlation with nativist ideology, perceived cultural threat, and endorsement of exclusionary policies than with individual religiosity, aligning with the notion that Islamophobia functions as a secular boundary-making mechanism rather than a consequence of religious attendance or personal belief (Escolà-Gascón et al., 2022; Arzheimer, 2025).

A possible counterargument is that opinions identified as Islamophobia may predominantly reflect wider anti-immigration sentiments, economic instability, or a generalized suspicion of outgroups. This overlap is credible, particularly when religious identification overlaps with ethnicity and socioeconomic status. The research underscores specific mechanisms associated with visible religious identifiers, security framing, and the construction of cultural boundaries. Recognizing Islamophobia as analytically different prevents the underestimation of the persistence of religious stigmatization, even under declining migration numbers.

#### **4.4. Policy Implications and Mechanisms**

The enduring presence of Islamophobia in Germany indicates mechanisms that extend beyond general migratory apprehension, functioning instead through identity-specific signals, visibility indicators, and media representation. A primary implication is the focused safeguarding of mosques and overtly Muslim communities. Field and audit experiments indicate that visibility associated with Muslim identity, particularly headscarves, results in quantifiable disadvantages in daily interactions and employment opportunities, highlighting vulnerability beyond periods of increased crime and advocating for prioritized protection of symbolically marked individuals and locations (Fernández-Reino et al., 2023; Weichselbaumer, 2020). Given that discrimination and hostility are partially instigated by visual indicators, it is imperative that risk evaluations and security enhancements for mosques and community centers be implemented as standard policy rather than merely as temporary responses to high-profile incidents (Fernández-Reino et al., 2023; Weichselbaumer, 2020).

A secondary implication is education that expressly addresses Islamophobia rather than merely generic antiracism. Content analyses of German news reveal enduring problem-focused frameworks that associate Islam with conflict and terrorism, so maintaining religion as a significant boundary even when migration flows diminish (Richter & Paasch-Colberg, 2023). Communication and curriculum must explicitly identify Islamophobia, rectify conventional linkages with violence or gender injustice, and advocate for counter-narratives that normalize the everyday experiences of Muslims. Research indicates that effectively designed direct and vicarious contact interventions can diminish prejudice when interactions are structured, cooperative, and supported by social norms, including narratives in literature and film that promote vicarious contact (Vezzali et al., 2015). Raw proximity seldom alters perceptions; therefore, educational institutions and local governments ought to facilitate ongoing, purpose-driven interactions between Muslim and non-Muslim residents, while incorporating media literacy curricula that instruct audiences on identifying sensationalized conflict narratives (Vezzali et al., 2015).

A third conclusion pertains to informational contexts and stigma. Studies indicate that exposure to terrorism-related content on social media heightens perceived stigmatization among Muslim minorities, leading to disengagement and anticipatory self-protection (Kaskeleviciute et al., 2025). Programs that integrate counter-messaging, user-side friction against misinformation, and community-based digital literacy are pertinent for mitigating the amplification of symbolic threats. These may be coupled with bystander empowerment and confrontation training, since experimental studies indicate that addressing prejudice can diminish its future manifestation; nevertheless, bystanders frequently remain inactive without the necessary skills and cues (Szekeres et al., 2023). Integrating bystander curriculum in academic institutions and businesses enhances contact-based education and tackles habitual harassment in public areas.

Ultimately, legislation must enhance hate crime reporting mechanisms and victim support, as underreporting is a systemic characteristic of bias offenses. Comparative criminology indicates that the decision to report is influenced by trust in law enforcement, anticipated procedural equity, understanding of legal concepts, and a cost-benefit analysis perceived as disadvantageous by many victims (Cuerden & Blakemore, 2020; Myers & Lantz, 2020). Practical measures encompass clear language definitions, multilingual platforms, anonymous preliminary reports that direct victims to advisors, feedback mechanisms that demonstrate improvement, and collaborations with civil society to address trust deficits. Numerous anti-Muslim incidents fail to meet the criminal threshold; thus, integrating administrative data with systematic civil society documentation enables decision-makers to monitor both criminal offenses and sub-criminal harassment that contribute to a climate of fear (Myers & Lantz, 2020; Cuerden & Blakemore, 2020).

The processes that perpetuate Islamophobia are symbolic and structural, rather than solely demographic. Effective policy thus integrates focused security measures for religious sites, comprehensive education on Islamophobia rooted in structured interactions and media literacy, stigma-conscious interventions in digital environments, and reporting mechanisms that reduce costs for victims while fostering trust within the most impacted communities.

Policy approaches encounter a prevalent criticism that an excessive focus on security and law enforcement may unwittingly perpetuate stigma by regarding Muslims predominantly as subjects of risk management. To mitigate this, reporting reforms and protective measures must be integrated with community-driven prevention, victim assistance, and public discourse that distinguishes criminal accountability from collective culpability. This equilibrium is crucial for safeguarding civil freedoms while enhancing institutional responsiveness to bias-related violations.

## 5. Conclusions

Focusing on Islamophobia rather than generic xenophobia clarifies the mechanisms that structure hostility in contemporary Germany. The refugee inflow of 2015 and 2016 was followed by not only a short-term anti-immigrant backlash but also a longer arc of religion-specific hostility. Official “islamfeindlich” crime statistics from 2017 to 2024 show a persistent and recently intensifying pattern of anti-Muslim incidents, which underscores the salience of Muslim identity in structuring patterns of prejudice and everyday risks experienced by visibly Muslim people and institutions.

Theoretically, the findings speak to two literatures that are often treated in parallel. Group threat theory helps interpret the initial emergence of hostility during periods of rapid demographic change, when perceived competition and issue salience intensify. Yet the durability and symbolic targeting observed after 2017 are better captured by work on Islamophobia, which emphasizes the role of religious identity, visibility cues, and narrative framing. Taken together, the evidence supports a layered account. Demographic shocks can open a window for hostility, but the long-term structure of prejudice is maintained through cultural signifiers and institutional routines that keep religion salient even when inflows subside. Importantly, these findings do not imply a causal relationship but clarify how religion-specific hostility has been structured and sustained in the post-2015 period.

Practically, the results help inform targeted policy responses. First, protection of mosques and community spaces should be risk-based and routine rather than reserved for crisis moments. Second, education and professional training should name Islamophobia directly, combine structured contact with media literacy, and address stereotypes about religion and gender. Third, reporting systems should lower costs for victims, offer multilingual support, and integrate administrative data with civil society records so that sub-criminal harassment is not invisible to decision-makers.

Future research can push precision on three fronts. First, link local refugee allocation data to subsequent anti-Muslim incidents to estimate dose-response relationships and identify thresholds that trigger escalation. Second, test the contact hypothesis in settings where interaction is structured, cooperative, and norm-supported, and distinguish these from mere geographic proximity. Third, build panel measures that capture both perceived stigma and behavioral responses, so that changes in fear, withdrawal from public space, and trust in institutions are tracked alongside recorded offenses.

By integrating theory, measurement, and policy, this article shows how the refugee crisis reshaped Germany’s landscape of prejudice. The shift from general anti-immigrant sentiment to religion-specific hostility is not incidental. It is the pathway through which a moment of

shock became a durable line of conflict, and it is the level at which effective prevention and protection must now operate.

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The author declares no conflict of interest in the conduct or publication of the results of this study.

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